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Abstract 
 
In this paper we explore the prima facie puzzling issue of why so much contemporary theory 
in economic geography and regional planning – specifically New Economic Geography (NEG) 
and New Regionalism (NR) - has so little to say about the causes of the current post-2007 
crisis and its geography globally and in Europe. We argue that this reflects its obsession with 
the regional ‘success stories of the 1970s and 1980s, its failure to appreciate the onset of 
crisis and the reasons for it in these regions in the 1990s, and its failure to appreciate the 
nature of capitalism as a crisis prone social system of combined and uneven development. 
Thus the current economic crisis pushed dominant regional development theories to an 
homologous deep theoretical crisis. We conclude that the time is ripe for a paradigm shift in 
theory and that this should involve a reconsideration of earlier theoretical approaches that 
fell out of fashion for a variety of intellectual and political reasons and of current radical social 
movements. 
 
Key words: uneven geographical development- Eurozone- neoliberal discourse- theoretical 
crisis  
 
Introduction 
 
It is generally recognised that capitalist development occurs unevenly over space and time, 
and that such unevenness is one of its defining characteristics. Equally, it is generally 
recognised that capitalist development is characterised by periodic crises, of varying extent 
and severity. Not surprisingly, then, several authors and commentators have recognised that 
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uneven geographical development is an important component of the current crisis of 
capitalism, both globally and specifically in the European Union and Eurozone (HARVEY, 2010, 
2011; SMITH, SWAIN, 2010; MARTIN, 2011; HADJIMICHALIS, 2011; NOVY, 2012; SMITH, 
2013).  
From the house price and mortgage loan bubbles in USA in 2006-07 analysed by HARVEY 
(2010) as “a class project”, the crisis spread around the world and it took various forms 
depending on local conditions and on the form of geo-economic and geo-political integration 
of each particular country and region into the international division of labour. The causes of 
the crisis and the diffusion of its effects have been from the outset highly geographically 
uneven but this attracted less attention than its macro-economic explanations. These 
spatially variegated causes and effects largely resulted from a combination of three elements: 
the real estate sector, the banking system and public/private debt. A unified process linking 
these three elements was (and remains) global financialization and its geography (AALBERS, 
2009; PIKE, POLLARD, 2010). Although global financial markets appear as space-free this is far 
from the truth, not only because of different national and regional banking systems but more 
importantly because of, first, significant unevenness in their local regulations and the intense 
competition among major financial centers, such as London and New York; and second, due 
to spatially differentiated financial innovations and increased banking leverage (HARVEY, 
2010; MARTIN, 2011).  
In Europe the first signs of crisis emerged in Spain’s real estate sector (particularly 
tourism real estate), in the former communist countries of Eastern-Central Europe and in 
the Irish banking sector. To this should be added Iceland’s bankrupt financial sector, a non-
EU country but with many financial ties with EU banks. For East-Central European countries 
and regions offensive privatizations and dispossession of public assets, internationalization 
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of the financial sector, cheap credit, and increasing reliance on exports and foreign 
investments paved the way for rapid crisis transmission (SMITH, SWAIN, 2010; RAE, 2011). 
Hungary experienced a fiscal crisis because it was suddenly unable to finance its relatively 
large budget deficit, Ukraine and the Baltic states experienced a severe banking crisis and in 
Russia the crisis was due to worldwide decline in demand. In general, the eastern expansion 
of EU occurred under conditions of uneven geographical development between both 
Eastern and Western Europe as well as within Eastern Europe, among its regions. These 
socio-spatial inequalities have been exposed by the global crisis and the new “capitalist” 
economies and societies in East-Central Europe suffered a major downturn despite the 
initial euphoria following the entry into the EU (RAE, 2011).  
The crisis was transmitted from USA and other rich countries of Europe to the global 
South through declining export demand for southern products and a decline in capital 
flows. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations that countries in the global South would be hit 
harder than rich countries of the North, several of the Asian economies experienced lower 
declines in economic growth and they recovered more quickly, while in Latin America Brazil, 
Venezuela and Argentina showed remarkable growth during the same period (REDDY, 2009; 
CHANG, 2011; DAS, 2012). Some countries in Asia, such as Japan, experienced a deep 
decline in GDP, while others like China, South Korea and India was expected to be least 
affected despite their recent lower growth. In India, for example, strong state 
interventionist policies emphasize growth, financial stability and some form of distributional 
policies by providing an easy flow of credit to socially sensitive sectors like agriculture, small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and housing (REDDY, 2009). In addition, the lower 
level of development of financial institutions and the lack of “innovative” financial products 
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in most countries of the global South made them less fragile to such crisis and easier to 
regulate.  
Although the crisis is global and concepts of regional development and policies need a 
more thorough reconsideration, in our paper we focus on Southern Europe (SE) while 
acknowledging that other parts of the world and of the continent, particularly in the East, 
face similar problems. Our focus in SE derives not only from our particular knowledge of the 
region but also from our theoretical stand point that, first, capitalist development and its 
crisis are contested and must be analysed in the context of particular social formations and 
not in the abstract. And second, because some formerly “successful” regions in SE, such as 
the Third Italy, were among the prime empirical cases informing regional development 
theories and policies on which our critique focuses. After all, the current capitalist crisis is a 
good example of “glocalisation”, as MARTIN (2010) suggests, and we should understand and 
analyze its causes and effects accordingly. 
The structure of paper is thus as follows. First, we discuss what we call a decisive 
moment, that is, the decline of regional dynamism in SE during the 1990s and the formation 
of the Eurozone since the 2000s. Second we switch the focus of our comments to theory in 
geography, and especially those forms of theory that became dominant in political-
economic geography and regional development in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century which took some SE regions as their models. Following similar debates in 
economics, where the financial crisis has thrown economics itself into crisis, we argue that 
the geographical foundations of the crisis and its effects on “model” regions pushed 
dominant regional development theories to an homologous deep theoretical crisis. And 
third, we propose a paradigm shift involving for a revaluation of older political economy 
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approaches and for attention to current radical social movements in providing regional 
alternatives worldwide.  
 
A decisive moment: the erosion of “model regions” and the formation of the Eurozone 
 
An appreciation of the importance of uneven development is especially important in 
understanding the causes and consequences of the crisis in SE. Three dimensions of uneven 
development are of particular significance in this context. First, there is a well-established 
structure of uneven development globally in which SE is located. Secondly, there are historical 
and recent structures of unevenness as between the North and South of the EU. And thirdly, 
there is an equally well-established structure of uneven development within SE. This was 
amplified, however as a result of major restructuring in production structures and conditions 
of trade there which underlay the emergence of crisis in the late 1980s and 1990s in those 
formerly successful industrial districts that had been held up as ‘model regions’, to be 
emulated and mimicked elsewhere. As we argue later in the paper, this takes on a particular 
significance in relation to geographical theory and the inability of dominant forms of theory to 
speak to the crisis. Rather than focus only upon recent public and private debt in the first 
decade of the 21st century as the causes of crisis in SE, and without denying the serious 
effects of debt on SE, we look for its origins in changes in productive and trade structures that 
exacerbated uneven development in the previous decade. 
The emergence of crisis in the 1990s in the formerly successful industrial districts 
reflected some or all of the following. Firstly, there was the erosion of protectionist measures, 
with the ending of the Multi-Fibre Agreement, in 2004, the disappearance of the opportunity 
of national devaluation in 2001 following the formation of the Euro and the reduction or 
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outright abolition of the ability of national states and regions to help local companies via 
regional incentives and services to firms (ALBERTI, 2006; HADJIMICHALIS, 2006). Secondly, 
new competitors entered the global market producing products similar to those made in SE 
but with lower production costs, resulting in a massive delocalisation of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) from SE as they sought to maintain cost competiveness (for example 
see HUDSON, 2003; LABRIANIDIS, 2008; LURASCHI, 2011). Thirdly, at the same time, there 
was a reduction in global demand for products manufactured in SE with growing 
subordination to the demands of customers and pressures from technological changes 
(BRIOSCHI, ET AL.,2002). And finally, there were significant endogenous weaknesses in the 
mode of social reproduction of the systems of SMEs such as demographic decline, strategic 
myopia, a shortfall of cooperative capability and cultural and social changes in the labour 
force, particularly after massive immigration from Africa and Asia (LANZIANI, 2003; YBARRA, 
2006; NESI, 2010). Difficulties in industrial districts followed similar negative developments in 
the tourist sector, where second homes real estate bubbles, overcrowded tourist resorts and 
price increases made other holiday destinations more attractive (MELISSOURGOS, 2010). 
Finally, in agriculture changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) led to increased 
production costs and competition from non-EU countries (following trade liberalisation) 
contributed to a further decline of regional competitiveness, despite the massive presence of 
cheap immigrant labour in southern fields (MOYANO-ESTRADA ET AL, 2001). These 
developments negatively influenced SE regional economic performance, considerably 
weakened regional tax bases - thus increasing public debt - and finally have reduced national 
and regional competitiveness. 
The formation of the Eurozone in 2000 brought together the regions of Northern and 
Southern Europe in a common currency space, at a moment when the latter confronted 
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important internal problems. From the outset – indeed well before the Eurozone actually 
came into being – it was clear that it could only exacerbate problems of uneven development 
within the EU and amplify the emergent crisis in SE. Despite this, very few people in key 
political and policy positions in SE and in the EU Commission – under the influence of 
neoliberal doctrine – paid much attention to the major qualitative differences between the 
Northern “core” of the Eurozone and Southern European economies (and this was also the 
case in relation to the Eastern periphery), to pre-existing highly unequal regional production 
systems and specializations, to their structurally different regional labour markets and to their 
unequal accessibility to markets, economically, institutionally and spatially (MEDELFART ET 
AL., 2003; OVERBEEK, 2012). The major – indeed sole  - policy focus in the very formation of 
the Eurozone was the priority given to the so-called “national convergence criteria” (price 
stability, low interest rates, stable exchange rates and limits on the size of budget deficits and 
national debts) and the total neglect of spatial or regional convergence. In the debate on the 
Euro in the early 2000s very little attention was paid to geographical differences and that 
continued to be the case in the subsequent debate on the debt crisis. Yet the fact that the 
common Euro currency space would unavoidably exacerbate uneven development within this 
policy framework and priorities should have come as no surprise because the recognised four 
conditions for a successful monetary union were all violated (MAGNIFICO, 1973; THIRLWALL, 
2000; MARTIN, 2000). For a monetary union to be successful the economic and social 
structures of regions within it should satisfy the following conditions: 
 
(a) they should have a degree of economic and productive similarity and equality in the value 
of flows of exports and imports in order to avoid trade surpluses in export regions and trade 
deficits in importing regions. In the absence of such similarities and complementarities 
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restrictive neoliberal monetary policies will produce new and exacerbate existing 
geographically uneven levels of employment/unemploymenti;  
(b) there should be high rates of geographical mobility not only for capital but also for labour. 
If such mobility is weak, especially as regards labour, as was and remains the case within the 
EU, cyclical crisis may lead to persistent regional inequalities;  
(c) regions should have similar propensities to inflation, and  
(d) there should be an automatic fiscal mechanism which through a centrally-organised tax 
and benefit system will compensate for different national and regional shocks and growth 
rates. There should also be a central bank which should operate as the “lender of last resort”. 
This last condition is absolutely critical. 
 
Crucially, none of these conditions existed at the time of the introduction of the Euro. As a 
result, SE regional economies, including those formerly seen as “success stories”, together 
with Ireland, became the weak link in a very unstable monetary union and the old social and 
spatial division of labour between North and South in Europe began to be reproduced in a 
heightened manner. This spatial imbalance was further exacerbated by the changing contours 
of the global economy, and especially the rise of China and other parts of south east Asia in 
particular, which intensified cost-based competition for many of the products in which the SE 
economies had specialised (see DICKEN, 2011, for example).  
By 2010, the EU, ECB (European Central Bank) and IMF, the so called “troika”, launched 
a controversial rescue plan based on ultra-austerity, designed supposedly to help one of the 
so-called, in a typical neo-colonial way, PIIGS, namely Greece. Ireland became the second 
victim followed by Portugal while Spain and Italy suffered homologous crisis without a 
coherent rescue plan but with similar extreme austerity measures. These developments 
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highlighted the magnitude and the structural foundations of the Eurozone crisis, further 
exacerbated by Cyprus in 2013 and the “haircut” of its bank savings. After three years of 
implementation of so-called rescue plans, SE countries and their regions continue to face 
negative growth, increasing public debt, high unemployment and deep impoverishment of 
their population (BELINA, 2013; HADJIMICHALIS, forthcoming). Although some voices in the 
EU Commission and the IMF speak about “deep structural inefficiencies in the Eurozone 
architecture” (see the report by THE ECONOMIST, 23 March 2013) and a few others raise 
the issue of “major social and regional inequalities” (ECB, 2012), the key issue of uneven 
geographical/regional development and related policies remain unspoken. 
 
Some comments on the irrelevance of dominant geographical and regional development 
theories 
 
At this point, we switch the focus of our comments to theory in geography, and especially 
those forms of theory that became dominant in political-economic geography in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century. If our argument about the social and geographical/regional 
foundations and components of the current crisis in the Eurozone is valid, then it is 
reasonable to ask what was the reaction from researchers in our field, from economic 
geographers, regional planners and policy makers. As far as we know and until finishing this 
paper, with honorable exceptions, it was very limited indeed, almost a guilty silence. This 
again is nothing to be surprised about, however, as the dominant policy views on European 
integration and regional development in Europe and beyond over the last three decades were 
informed by neoliberal thinking and theories (for USA see, among others, HARVEY 2010; 
PECK, 2012) and as such it is hardly surprising that they had little to say that was self-critical. 
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We equally didn’t expect reactions from those on the left whose perspectives were narrowly 
confined, seeing only the capital-labour conflict as the problem and the EU as evil. While we 
would agree that capital-labour conflict remains a crucial dimension of inequality, it is by no 
means the only aspect of inequality that matters. And while we agree that the current form of 
the EU and the Eurozone are problematic, that is no reason to jettison a concern for a 
European project that gives greater attention to issues of socio-spatial justice. 
What might – prima facie at least – seem  more surprising though is the silence of those 
progressive and leftist colleagues who, following a kind of ‘third way thinking”, were 
responsible for developing new theoretical approaches and shaping local and regional 
development policies before and after the crisis, promoting new ideas on trade and 
geographical economics, on innovative, networking and learning regions, on clusters and 
agglomeration, on branding, on local social capital, reciprocity, trust and so on – people who 
today remain silent. As is by now well-known – and so we simply briefly mention them here  - 
this “third way of thinking” is identified with two major schools of thought: first, the so-called 
New Economic Geography (NEG) or “geographical economics” with key thinkers such as 
KRUGMAN (1991), FUJITA and Krugman (2004) and VENABLES (1996)ii; and second, New 
Regionalism (NR) with key advocates including COOKE and MORGAN (1998), AMIN and 
THRIFT (1992), ASHEIM (2000), BECATTINI (1990), STORPER (1997), and SCOTT (1988) among 
othersiii. 
 There is no doubt that these scholars contributed positively to a major renewal of the 
local and regional development repertoire and have opened promising research windows. 
However, their treatment of local and regional problems, together with that of modernized 
versions of old neoclassical theories which effectively deny the problems of uneven 
development and are linked with macroeconomic top-down planning (such as the work of 
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BARRO and SALA-I-MARTIN, 1995), is – or perhaps better, can be seen as - often, whether 
deliberately or inadvertently, compatible with and supportive of a neoliberal view. All cities 
and regions can become “winners”, finding a successful niche in the globalizing economy – 
provided that they adopt appropriate institutional arrangements, appropriate social attitudes 
and successfully utilize their resource endowments, whatever they may be. While not 
eliminating problems of uneven development in the same way as the neo-classically informed 
theories - that is by assumption – the practical effect of the claims made by policy makers 
drawing on the “Third Way” approaches is in effect the same as the problems of uneven 
development can apparently, so it is claimed, be eliminated via institutional innovation and 
modernized social attitudes to development. Let us be clear: we are not arguing that theories 
of NEG or NR are neoliberal stricto sensu, or that their exponents are neoliberals. Indeed 
quite a few of them would see themselves as on and of the Left. Nor are we denying that 
clustering, networking, agglomeration etc could form part of a progressive regional policy. All 
that we are saying is that the way in which they have formulated – directly or indirectly – and 
framed the original question posed in the 1970s by DOREEN MASSEY (1979 - “in what sense a 
regional problem?”) and the ways in which they have theoretically responded was (at best) 
de-politicized at a time when what was needed was a frontal attack against neoliberalismiv. It 
is unclear as to whether this de-politicization was deliberate or an inadvertent and 
unintended effect because policy implementation based on these theories is blind to their 
effects on socio-spatial inequality. We know, however, that this has made it easy to absorb 
their views into neoliberal policies, as a result making it sometimes difficult to differentiate 
progressive from regressive applications and policy directions. In that sense there was a 
gradual slide towards the dominant neoliberal discourse and, when the current global crisis 
arrived in European regions, neoclassical, NEG and NR theories were all caught unawares and 
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remain unable to understand its multi-scalar geographical/regional causes. Thus the current 
economic crisis pushed dominant regional development theories to an homologous deep 
theoretical crisis. Let us amplify this claim with four points: 
 
1. A basic common characteristic among neoliberal, NEG and NR theories and policies is 
their acclaim of the market, their championing of entrepreneurialism, competitiveness and 
labour flexibilities, all seemingly raised to the status of divine law. While they do not quite 
naturalise markets, they take a very partial view of the ways in which and purposes for which 
markets are politically constructed and socially regulated. Not only do they ignore issues of 
social and spatial redistribution, socio-spatial justice and interventionist regional policies, 
which were the cornerstones of “old” welfare regionalism, but they see them as a drag and a 
brake on regional development itself, as counter-productive rather than as a necessary step 
in addressing both spatial inequalities and the deeper structural crisis in which they are 
inextricably embedded. Within the perspectives of NEG and NR, cities and regions are viewed 
as quasi-individuals, as actors responsible for finding their own ways to economic prosperity 
in competition with others. What regions (or cities) need, according to these perspectives, is 
less politics (that is, of an interventionist and progressively redistributive sort, acknowledging 
that the success of some regions is related to the failure of others), more competition, more 
innovation experts, more pluralism, more learning and more tolerance. In this respect they 
have been associated at the subnational scale with the wider de-politicization that has been a 
key objective of neoliberalisation at the national and global scales. Furthermore, de-
politicization has been essential for the legitimation of the undemocratic and authoritarian 
EU, ECB and IMF intervention to ‘help’ Southern Europe and Ireland (BALIBAR, 2012). Similar 
de-politicization experiences were typical under neoliberalism in other places and are 
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observable worldwide, as the cases of the USA, Mexico and above all China demonstrate. 
Seen from another perspective, however, this is of course neither more nor less than saying 
that they promulgate a different kind of politics, a regressive politics that privileges particular 
socio-spatial class interests and ignores others. 
2. NEG theories and NR focus exclusively on a few successful ‘super-star’ regions and 
cities, neglect all other ‘ordinary’ places and base their explanation of success mainly on 
internal, endogenous factors within the region or the urban area in question, ignoring 
exogenous forces (HADJIMICHALIS, HUDSON, 2007). This emphasis reflects a cognitive shift 
towards seeing places as discrete entities to be studied in their own right, as actors 
responsible for their own economic fate. This perspective is highly compatible with neoliberal 
discourse which promotes the success of the few, applauds idealized competitive individual 
efforts, ignores relational politics and downplays wider social and spatial conditions, 
especially of those people and places that were deemed to have failed. In these successful 
places, NEG theorists look for increasing returns to scale via spatial agglomeration as the 
critical determinant of success and they prioritize large metropolitan regions as the locations 
in which this is best attained. They further constrain their conceptualisations of social process 
to fit with mathematically tractable solutions to their models. In addition, this particular focus 
helped the establishment and reinforcement of arguments that the causes of the crisis are 
only endogenous (for example, a result of corrupt governments, or of firms that lack 
innovative capacity, of cheating citizens, and so on). Without denying that there are instances 
where such explanations have validity, such a focus left crucial exogenous forces, such as the 
very operation of global markets, the Eurozone and global capital flows, undiscussed, 
unexamined and seemingly unproblematic. It seems that decades of studies on global uneven 
geographical development and on the impacts of the international division of labour never 
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existed. 
3. Following the previous emphasis on regions and urban areas as the pivotal spatial 
scale for capitalist success, these approaches ignore the regulatory role of the national state 
and EU institutions, particularly their potential in the struggle to ameliorate the lives of 
people in the places that ‘failed’ (MACLEOD, 2001; HUDSON, 2007) and/or in providing 
protectionist measures for particular sectors. In a period in which major governance re-
scaling and the widespread introduction of public–private partnerships took place across 
Europe, NR approaches continued to focus only on the cultural and institutional conditions of 
particular successful regions and cities while the proponents of NEG emphasised the interplay 
of agglomeration and economic success and neo-classically inspired approaches emphasised 
general equilibrium models with a spatial geometry in which transportation costs are the only 
parameter entering the picture (BARNES, 2003). On the one hand, underplaying the role of 
the national state and EU institutions is again compatible with the neoliberal dogma of ‘less 
state – more market’, followed by class-biased policies for deregulation and deconstruction of 
the welfare state and a massive re-regulation shaped by the needs of capital. On the other 
hand, their overemphasis on ‘successful’ regions did little to help these approaches to 
understand the geographical/regional foundations of the current crisis and to recognize the 
major spatial governance change introduced by the Eurozone. In other words they failed to 
recognize that the Eurozone is a new spatial arena for capital accumulation based on uneven 
development. 
4. Although these mainstream views pay attention to particular regions and cities and 
have provided pioneering analyses of local productive and institutional structures, they have 
overemphasized the supply side, giving scant, if any, attention to understanding the empirical 
dynamic of the demand side, to global capitalist competition and to a balanced consideration 
 16 
 
16 
of international trade. The question of the share of value added received by labour is crucial 
and became a major competitive element after the introduction of the Euro and creation of 
the Eurozone. The inadequate analysis of the commercialization, distribution and retailing of 
products and services coming from ‘model regions’ became a major handicap for NR, but this 
was realized only after 2000 and the emergence of the first signs of crisis. On the other hand, 
NEG gives particular attention to trade in the context of imperfect competition. However, 
despite its new terminology it essentially conforms to a partial equilibrium model analysis, 
continuing to use variables in which productive factors are partly fixed and partly footloose, 
make simplistic assumptions about transportation costs and to ignore unequal terms of trade. 
The latter helped to mask unequal trade among Eurozone regions, in particular how debts in 
the European periphery are related to trade surpluses in the centre-North. Finally a major 
problem in NEG and NR theories and policies is their neglect of the role of financial capital in 
regional development and how the invention of new financial products such as derivatives 
and securitized income streams from fictitious capital has undermined investments in 
industrial production, providing higher profit rates to speculative investments in real estate 
and other toxic assets. This negation played also its role in the silence of major protagonists 
during the current financial crisis.  
 
These four points summarize the distance between NEG and NR and older progressive 
formulations of welfare regionalism, to say nothing of left-wing views of combined and 
uneven regional and geographical development which focus upon the systemic features of 
capitalist development. However, NEG and NR clearly cannot be blamed for all problems in 
the Eurozone or for the character of EU, ECB and IMF interventions, nor for their influence on 
regional policies beyond Europe. And although these theories have inherent limitations in 
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their initial assumptions and they neglect the conflict-driven character of capitalist societies, 
the message we read and the analyses we draw cannot be attributed to these theories alone. 
Our argument is a different one: that is, that the dominant discourse in our field, by sliding 
consciously or unconsciously towards neoliberalism – as has happened in other fields such as 
economics, public health, labour legislation, higher education, and cultural activities – now 
has had serious negative practical effects. First, it resulted in an inability to understand the 
geographical/regional foundation of the crisis. Secondly, it helped to direct regional 
development questions into inoffensive paths by seemingly – because surely these paths are 
very political - de-politicizing them, as it is evident in major policy documents, such as ESPON. 
Above all they have destabilized the central pillar of progressive regional policies: institutions 
for collective action at multiple scales. 
Perhaps the biggest failure of the neoclassical, NEG and the NR approaches is their failure 
to develop a systemic view of capitalism and as a result their neglect of periodic capitalist 
crises - euphemistically referred to ‘systemic failures’ by neoliberal economic advisers - as a 
necessary and recurrent feature of capitalist development (see HARVEY, 2011). Crisis is 
endemic to capitalism: the issue is the forms and places in which it emerges, the distribution 
of its effects across social classes, groups and places, and the capacity of states selectively to 
mitigate its effects, privileging some places/social groups over others. Fundamentally, the 
current crisis reflects the disjunction between the volume of value produced and the claims 
made upon it, in particular as a result of speculative financial activities. The failure of NR and 
NEG approaches to appreciate the centrality of capitalist crisis seriously weaken their 
explanatory power and so practical utility. This negation – the refusal to recognise that crisis 
and uneven development are inherent to capitalism - is typical of all apologetic analyses of 
capitalism. As such, it is to be expected from proponents of both the neoliberal and 
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neoclassical perspectives.  
But it is perhaps more surprising that very few ‘third way’ NEG and NR researchers paid 
much attention to the capitalist crisis that was already visible from the 1990s in the Third 
Italy, in Valencia, in Murcia, in Oporto, in Kastoria, along the Mediterranean tourist coasts and 
other emblematic regions (RENZI, 2002; FONDAZIONE NORDEST, 2003; BERTONCIN ET AL, 
2009). Just at the very moment that policy prescriptions based upon the assumed bases of 
success in these regions were becoming generalised within regional and urban policies across 
the globe, the conditions on which success had been based in these exemplar regions were 
being eroded. This failure to appreciate the significance of the onset of crisis in formerly 
successful regions was symptomatic of a broader malaise and the neglect of capitalist crisis 
noted above. It would seem that nowadays many people are either unaware of Keynes and 
what he really stood for, and do not know of Myrdal’s work on ‘cumulative causation’ and 
‘backwash effects’, or if they do, consider them of little relevance. Furthermore, combined 
and uneven development evidently sounds ‘too political’ and for many understanding and 
appreciation of the continuing relevance of Marx is likewise negligible (for example, see 
HUDSON, 2005, HARVEY, 2010). 
 
Towards a paradigm shift? 
 
The crisis of dominant regional development theories indicates clearly that it is time for 
a paradigm shift – and this may involve a double shift: one back to earlier political economy 
paradigms that fell out of political and intellectual fashion, although without repeating 
mistakes of the past, particularly those related to clientelism and bureaucratic statism; the 
other is a step forward integrating lessons from emancipatory grass-root social movements 
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and social struggles across Europe and beyond which never found a place in NEG and NR. 
Both shifts are important (see also MACKINNON ET AL, 2009; HARVEY, 2010; HADJIMICHALIS, 
HUDSON, 2007; VAIOU, HADJIMICHALIS, 2012; HADJIMICHALIS, forthcoming), so here we can 
only briefly sketch some of its aspects. 
NEG and NR contributed to a substantial renewal of local/regional development theory 
and there is no need to throw them out with the dirty bathwater, as they did their advocates 
with welfare regionalism. We can retain some aspects of their approaches, while searching 
for radical alternatives pursuing greater socio-spatial justice. In doing this and following our 
critique, first, we have to re-politicize our thinking and practice, to ask questions such as who 
is losing/benefiting, why and where (for example, see PIKE ET AL. 2007). Second, we need to 
go beyond the endogenous development paradigm, to understand cities, localities and 
regions as open to and often in large part constituted through global flows and international 
relations, albeit they are unique and locally embedded places. Development trajectories are 
always the outcome of both internal and external factors and it is important to understand 
for each case how the regional problem is defined, instead of only asking for more 
competitiveness, innovation, creativity and the like. Third, we stress the need for an inclusive 
approach that encompasses all cities and regions, including those ‘ordinary’ places that have 
never attracted the interests of recently dominant regional development theories. At the 
same time, there is a need for an appreciation of the fact that capitalist success is always 
temporary and place specific. Fourth, the national state and in Europe EU institutions have to 
be restored in the planning agenda as agents of active intervention in support of those people 
and places “left behind”. As DAVID HARVEY (2013, 153) has recently emphasised, “[t[the 
question of the state , and in particular what kind of state (or non-capitalist equivalent), 
cannot be avoided even in the midst of immense contemporary scepticism … of the viability 
 20 
 
20 
or desirability of such a form of institutionalization.…”. Institutions are not “out there” only to 
serve firms and to support regional success in a social conflict-free environment, they are 
multiscalar arenas of bitter power struggles. Here avoidance of past mistakes is essential, 
together with a re-examination of budgetary issues, of the role of the European Central Bank 
and other institutions. As everything depends on the balance of class and political forces, the 
question of political parties and their policies remains a key factor, so “think carefully for 
whom you vote”. Finally a new radical theoretical framework needs to include issues that 
NEG and NR never spoke about. These include, among others, an analysis of the changing 
contours of global accumulation, in short how the global economy is changing sectorally and 
spatially (for example, see DICKEN, 2011); the crucial issue of the economy as material 
transactions/transformations (HUDSON, 2012); ecological sustainability from a radical 
political ecology perspective and environmental justice (KEIL ET AL, 1998; KALLIS, NOVGAARd, 
2010); the importance of financialisation of the economy (HARVEY, 2011; PIKE, POLLARD, 
2009; MARTIN 2011) and the rupturing of the link between the production of surplus-value in 
the circuit of productive industrial capital and its reinvestment to expand productive capacity 
as realised surplus-value was sucked into circuits of fictitious capital, new financial 
commodities and speculative investments.  
Finally, we have to think seriously about all those local/regional grass-roots 
mobilisations, some of which provide progressive development solutions beyond formal 
institutions, the capitalist firm and beyond antagonistic relations within the capitalist 
division of labour (see KLEIN, 2002; WE ARE EVERYWHERE, 2003; GIBSON-GRAHAM, 2006; 
FEATHERSTONE, 2012; HADJIMICHALIS, forthcoming). Examples exist everywhere from 
movements against dispossession of public or natural assets to proactive movements 
introducing alternative, non-exploitative forms of production and distribution in Argentina, 
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Brazil, Peru, USA, Canada, Australia, Spain, Italy and recently in Greece. They vary in terms 
of tactics and goals, some are “accommodative” other are “transformative”, following 
NANCY FRASER (1995) and no one knows how long will last. But after all, especially those 
movements which are “transformative”, they challenge from below the one-dimensional 
neoliberal emphasis that “there is no alternative”. They can teach us how local culture, 
habits and reciprocity, particular forms of clustering, innovation, local institution and path 
dependent development trajectories –precisely these characteristics studied by NEG and NR 
in successful regions as competitive - could have an alternative reading and to study 
whether they have succeeded in creating  a less competitive and more just social and spatial 
structure. Of course the key point with much of the above goes back to RAYMOND 
WILLIAMS (1989) question as to the transferability of locally-based radical initiatives and 
‘militant particularisms’, but this we believe is a question of political practice rather than 
theory. 
 
Final comments 
 
There are those who argue that crises of capitalism provide opportunities for some people 
and places, acknowledging thereby the role of speculation and speculative developments. 
And it is undeniable that within the rationality of capital crises do create opportunities for 
some capitalist firms and entrepreneurs. Crises, in that sense, have a positive role in capitalist 
development (as MARX and later SCHUMPETER (1962) emphasised in their concept of 
creative destruction) but at considerable human and socio-spatial cost (thus triggering what 
POLYANI (1944) referred to as the double-movement as people sought to contest the 
negative consequences of marketization and deepening capitalist development). As radical 
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social scientists, we are interested in the understanding what triggers that double movement 
– and maybe even a triple movement (FRASER, 2013) in supporting it and in the search for 
opportunities for more progressive local and regional development policies and trajectories. 
Our task then is to search for theories and policies beyond neoliberalism, to re-establish the 
values and priorities for social and spatial justice and learn from radical initiatives across 
Europe and beyond, without forgetting the lessons of the past.   
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
This is a modified version of a paper presented to the 10th Aegean Seminar, Syros, September, 
2012 and to the Conference Curant et Theories en Geographie Economique, Paris, June 2013. 
A shortened version was also presented by one of the authors at the Regional Studies 
Association Early Career Conference, Hamburg, 2012, as a keynote address. We thank the 
organisers and participants of these meetings for their comments and the section editor of RS 
and the two referees for their valuable suggestions. The usual claims apply. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
AALBERS M (2009) “Geographies of financial crisis”, Area, 41, 34-42. 
ALBERTI F (2006) “The Decline of the Industrial District of Como: Recession, Relocation or 
Reconversion?”, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Vol. 18, No. 6, 473-501. 
AMIN A and THRIFT N (1992) “Neo-Marshallian nodes in global governance”, International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, 16, 571-587. 
 23 
 
23 
ASHEIM B (2000) “Industrial districts: the contributions of Marshall and beyond”, in Gertler M, 
Feldman M P  and Clark G L (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 413-431. 
BALIBAR E (2012) “What crisis, which Left, what Europe?”, EPOCHI newspaper, 10 March (in Greek). 
BARNES T (2003) “The place of locational analysis: a selective and interpretive history.” Progress in 
Human Geography 27 (1): 69-95 
BARRO R and SALA-I-MARTIN X (1995) Economic Growth. New York: McGraw Hill. 
BECATTINI G. (1990) “The Marshallian industrial district as a socio-economic notion”, in: F. PYKE, G. 
BECATTINI, W. SENGERBERGER (Eds.) Industrial Districts and the interfirm co-operation in 
Italy, ILO, Geneva, 134-142. 
BELINA B (2013) “What’s the matter with Germany? On Fetishizations of the Euro Crisis in 
Germany’s public discourse, and their basis in social processes and relations”, Human 
Geography, 6 (2):26-37. 
BERTONCIN M, MARINI D and PASE A (Eds.), Frontiere mobile: delocalizzazione e 
internationalizzazione del territori produtivi veneti, Venezia: Marsilio Editori 
BRIOSCHI F, BRIOSCHI MS and CAINELLI G. (2002) “From the industrial district to the district group: 
an insight into the evolution of local capitalism in Italy”, Regional Studies, 36 (9) 1037-1052. 
CHANG H-J (2011) “Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History”, Journal of 
Institutional Economics,7 (4): 473-498. 
COOKE P. and MORGAN K. (1998), The Associational Economy: Firms, Regions and Innovation, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
DAS D K (2012) “How Did the Asian Economy Cope with the Global Financial Crisis and Recession? A 
Reevaluation and Review”, Asia Pacific Business Review, 18 (1): 7-25. 
DICKEN P. (2011) Global Shift. London: Sage (6th edition) 
 24 
 
24 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2012) “Regional divergence in the Euro area”, Directorate of 
Communications, Press Division, www.ecb.europa.eu. 
FEATHERSTONE D (2012) Solidarity: hidden histories and geographies of internationalism, London: 
Zed Books. 
FONDAZIONE NORDEST (2003) La de-localizzazione produtiva all estero nel settore moda: il Caso 
Vicenza, Venezia (mimeo). 
FRASER N (1995) “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ 
Age”, New Left Review, 212, 68-93. 
FRASER N (2013), Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis, 
London, Verso. 
FUJITA M and KRUGMAN P (2004), “The New Economic Geography: past, present and future”, 
Papers in Regional Science, 83, 139-164. 
GIBSON-GRAHAM J-K (200) A Post Capitalist Politics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
HADJIMICHALIS C and HUDSON R (2007) Rethinking local and regional development: Implications 
for radical political practice in Europe”. European Urban and Regional Studies 14(2): 99–113. 
HADJIMICHALIS C. (2006) “The end of Third Italy as we knew it?”, Antipode, 38 (1): 82-106 
HADJIMICHALIS C. (2011) “Uneven geographical development and socio-spatial justice and 
solidarity: European regions after the 2009 financial crisis”, European Urban and Regional 
Studies 18(3): 254–274 
HARVEY D (2010) The Enigma of Capital. London: Profile Books. 
HARVEY D (2011) “Crises, geographic disruptions and the uneven development of political 
responses” Economic Geography, 87(1): 1–22. 
HARVEY D, 2013, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution, London, Verso. 
 25 
 
25 
HUDSON R, 2003, “Global production systems and European integration” in: Peck J and Yeung H W-C 
(Eds.) Global Connections, Sage, London, 216-30. 
HUDSON R (2006), “On What’s Right and Keeping Left: Or Why Geography Still Needs Marxian 
Political Economy”, Antipode38, 374-95. 
HUDSON R (2007) “Regions and regional uneven development forever?” Some reflective comments 
upon theory and practice”, Regional Studies 14(9): 1149–1160. 
HUDSON R (2012) “Critical political economy and material transformation”, New Political Economy, 
17, 373-398. 
IL SOLE 24ORE (2002) « Carpi un distretto all cinese », 19.7.02. 
KALLIS G and NOVGAARD R B (2011) “Coevolutionary ecological economics”, Ecological Economics, 
69, 690-699. 
KEIL R, BELL D, PENZ P and FAWCETT L (Eds.) (1998) Political Ecology: Global and Local, London: 
Routledge. 
KLEIN N (2002) Fences and Windows: dispatches from the front lines of the globalization debate, 
London: Harper Collins. 
KRUGMAN P (1991), Geography and Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 
LABRIANIDIS L (Ed.) The Moving Frontier:the changing geography of production in labopur intensive 
industries, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
LANZIANI A. (2003) (ed) Metamorfosi urbane. I luoghi dell’immigrazione, Sala Editori: Pescara. 
LEE R, CLARK G, POLLARD J and LEYSHON A (2009) “The remit of finanical geography before and 
after the crisis”, Journal of Economic Geography, 9 (5): 723-747.  
LURASCHI A. (2011) “Life after the requiem: the post-district transition in the Comasco, Italy” 
(mimeo, available from the author: University of Insubria, Department of Economics, Via 
Monte Generoso, 73, 21100, Varese, Italy 
 26 
 
26 
MACKINNON D, CUMBERS A, PIKE A, BIRCH K and  MCMASTER R (2009) “Evolution in Economic 
Geography: Institutions, Political Economy and Adaptation”, Economic Geography, 85 (2): 
804-829. 
MACLEOD G (2001) “New regionalism reconsidered: Globalization and the remaking of political 
economic space”. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(4): 804–829 
MAGNIFICO G (1973) European Monetary Unification. London: Macmillan. 
MARTIN R (2000) “EMU versus the regions? Regional convergence and divergence in Euroland”. 
ESRC Center for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 179. 
MARTIN R (2012) “The local geographies of the financial crisis: from the housing bubble to 
economic recession and beyond”, Journal of Economic Geography, 11: 587-618. 
MASSEY D B (1979) “In what sense a regional problem”, Regional Studies, 13, 233-243. 
MEDELFART K-H, OVERMAN H and VENABLES A (2003) “Monetary union and the economic 
geography of Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies 41(5): 847–868. 
MELISSOURGOS G (2010) “Tourism restructuring and the geographies of tourist destinations: the 
case of golf in Costa del Sol”. Geographies, 17, 61-78 (in Greek). 
MOYANO-ESTRADA E (2001) “Federations of cooperatives and interest organized in agriculture: the 
Spanish case”, Sociologia Ruralis, 41 (2): 237-253. 
NESI E (2010) Storia della mia gente, Milano: RCS Libri. 
NOTES FROM NOWHERE (Ed.) (2003) We Are Everywhere, London: Verso. 
NOVY A. (2012) “Preliminary reflections on an eco-social civilization model for the 21st century”, 
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, 33 (1): 27-44. 
OVERBEEK H (2012) “Sovereign Debt Crisis in Euroland; roots, causes and implications for European 
integration”, The International Spectator, 47 (1): 30-48. 
PECJ J (2012) “Austerity urbanism: American cities under extreme austerity”, CITY,16 (6). 
 27 
 
27 
PIKE A and POLLARD J (2009) “Economic geographies of financialisation”, Economic Geography, 86, 
29-51. 
PIKE A, RODRIGUES-POSE A and TOMANEY J, 2007, “What kind of regional development and for 
whom?”, Regional Studies, 41, 1253-1269. 
POLANYI K (1944) The Great Transformation: economic and political origins of our time, Rinehart, 
New York. 
RAE G (2011) “On the Periphery: the Uneven Development of the European Union and the Effects 
of the Economic Crisis on Central-Eastern Europe”, Global Society, 25 (2): 249-266. 
REDDY Y V (2009) India and the Global Financial Crisis: Managing Money and Finance, Hyderabad: 
Orient BlackSwan. 
RENZI S, (2002) Distretto Industriale del Fermano e Fermano-Maceratese, Centro Studi G. B. 
Carducci, Fermo. 
SCHUMPETER J A (1962), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper Torch Books, New York, 
Chapter 7 
SCOTT A. (1988) New Industrial Spaces, Pion, London 
SMITH A (2013) “Europe and an inter-dependent world: uneven geo-economic and geo-political 
developments”, European Urban and Regional Studies, 20 (1): 3-31. 
SMITH A and Swain A (2010) “The global economic crisis, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union: models of development and the contradictions of internationalization”, Eurasian 
Geography and Economics, 51 (1): 1-34. 
STORPER M (1997), The Regional World: territorial development in a global economy, Guilford, New 
York  
THIRLWALL T (2000) The Euro and Regional Divergence in Europe. London: New Europe Research 
Trust. 
 28 
 
28 
VAIOU D and HADJIMICHALIS C (2012) Spaces in Left Thought, Athens: Nissos (in Greek). 
VENABLES A (1996) “Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries”, International Economic 
Review, 37, 341-359. 
WILLIAMS R (1989) Resources of Hope, London, Verso. 
YBARRA J A (2006) “Los distritos industrials en el desarrolo local Valenciano”, Paper presented at” 
XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki (mimeo) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
                                                 
i The exchange rate against countries outside the Euro area is the same for all the Euro countries. The rich regions get an 
exchange rate at a lower level than before, and the poorer regions get an exchange rate at a higher level than before. This 
gives a positive stimulus for export industries in the richer regions. German regions have profited as a result of this 
mechanism while the price of exports from other regions has risen due to the same mechanism. The Mediterranean 
regions in particular were affected by low manufacturing growth and the closure of factories as a result. 
ii To be fair KRUGMAN in his NY Times column has been repeatedly been very critical of austerity measures imposed to SE 
and showed the dead end of these policies. Here we refer to his geographical/regional contributions and how have been 
used by others. 
iii There are many well-known works by these authors and we have simply indicated a few of them here. Also we will not 
discuss here for reasons of space another sub-branch of “third way thinking”, that of evolutionary economic geography 
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(EEG) (see among others the special issue of Economic Geography 85(9), 2009). We only say that we are in agreement with 
the critique to these approaches provided by MACKINNON, CUMBERS, PIKE, BIRCH and MCMASTER (2009), who, while 
acknowledging many positive contributions by EEG, recognise the need  for consideration of  labour relations, the 
dynamics of capital accumulation and uneven development and to a general need to rediscover a sense of political 
economy.   
iv As well as the destruction being reaped on SE regions as a result of neoliberal doctrine, regions such as north east 
England and south Wales were being ripped apart economically in the 1980s via the same process. 
